




TiEE discussion of this subject will fall under two main heads,
first, the sources of married women's capacity to trade, how far
they could, trade at common law and in equity, and the effect of
modern statutes; and second, the incidents of married women's
capacity to trade-their rights, powers, obligations and disabilities,
when engaged in trade under some common law, equitable or stat-
utory capacity. Many points not directly involved must be referred
to for the purpose of argument and illustration, and on such points
the cases are not collected in this paper.
I. SOURCES OF MARRIED WOMEN'S CAPACITY TO TRADE.
Sect. 1. General view.-(a). At Common Law generally, a mar-
ried woman could make no contract whatever; Norris v. Lantz, IS
Md. 260, 269; all her time and labor belonged to her husband
(Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 580, 584), as did all the present en-
joyment of her property. See Mann's Appeal, 50 Penn. St. 375,
381. She had in fact no legal existence apart from her husband:
White v. Wager, 25 N. Y. 325, 328; therefore she could not trade
at all: Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 575; 43 Am. Rep. 790;
see Bradstreet v. Baer, 41 Md. 19, 23 ; .Netterville v. Barber, 52
Miss. 168, 171; McKivnon v. Mo.Donald, 4 Jones' Eq. 1. If a
female trader married, the trade became her husband's (Ashworth
v. Outram, L. R., 5 Ch. Div. 923, 929), and if she had been trad-
ing as partner, the partnership was dissolved: Alexander v. Mor-
gan, 31 Ohio St. 546, 550. But when owing to her husband's
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abandonment of the state, &c., she had the capacities of a feme
sole (see Stewart Mar. & Div., sect. 177), and in some places by
custom (Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 575, 43 Am. iRep. 790),
a married woman could trade as if unmarried.
(b). Wife's .Rarnings.-As a married woman could not contract
at all by the common law, she could not enter into any kind of
engagement or employment on her own account, but all her time,
services, wages and earnings of every kind, belonged to her hus-
band: Cecil v. Tuxon, 1 Atk. 278, 279; Glenn v. Johnson, 18
Wall. 476,-478; i1fcLemore v. Pinkston, 31 Ala. 267, 270; Bin-
man v. Parkis, 33 Conn. 188, 197; Hazelbaker v. Goodfellow,
64 Ill. 238, 241; Oranor v. Winters, 75 Ind. 301, 303; Glover v.
Alcott, 11 Mich. 471, 482; Raybold v. Baybold, 20 Penn. St. 308,
311 ; Hallowell v. Horter, 35 Id. 375, 380. Still her husband could
agree that she should have her earnings, just as he could invest her
with any property of his, except as against his creditors, and his
agreement would be enforced in equity: NeLemore v. Pinkston,
31 Ala. 267, 269; Peterson v. Mulford, 36 N. J. L. 482, 487;
Hoyt v. White, 46 N. H. 45, 47; -Elliott v. Bentley, 17 Wis. 591,
596. His agreement, however, could give her no personal capacity,
but only the right, in his place and stead, to collect and keep the
wages or rewards of her labors: Uhrig v. Horstman, 8 Bush 172,
177 ; Stewart Mar & Div., sect. 181. So by statute, in most states,
the wife's earnings are secured to her separate use: see Martin v.
Robson, 65 Ill. 129, 135, 16 Am. Rep. 578. . These statutes were
passed to protect wives from shiftless, improvident and dissipated
husbands (Youngworth v. Jewell, 15 Nev. 45, 47), and Were in
form the earliest of the statutes relating to the trade of married
women.
(c) The Increase of Wives' Separate Property.-Although at
common law all the interest, profits, rents and increase of a mar-
ried woman's property vested in the husband just as the property
itself did, except that the rents and profits of real estate vested in
him as personalty, she had her separate estate first in equity and
then by statute, and the increase of such estate was also separate
property: Gore v. Knight, 2 Vern. 535; Barrack v. Me Culloch,
3 Kay & J. 110, 119; Hoot v. Sorrell, 11 Ala. 386, 399, 404;
Sanford v. Atwood, 44 Conn. 141, 143; Bongard v. Core, 82 Ill.
19, 21; Stout v. Perry, 70 Ind. 501, 504; Russell v. Long, 52
Iowa 250, 252; Hanson v. Millett, 55 Me. 184, 189 ; Hill v.
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Ohambers, 30 Mich. 422, 429; Williams v. Mc'Grade, 13 Minn.
46, 52; Hutchins v. Colby, 43 N. H. 159, 161; Knapp v. Smith,
27 N. Y. 280; Holcomb v. lleadville," 92 Penn. St. 338, 343;
Nelson v. Hollins, 9 Baxt. 553, 554; Braden v. Gose, 57 Tex. 37,
40; Dayton v. Walsh, 47 Wis. 113, 118; and therefore the pro-
ducts of all investments or uses of her separate property, though
such products result in part from her own efforts and from the labor,
skill and knowledge of her husband: Aldridge v. Muihead, 101
U. S. 397, 399; Stout v. Terry, 70 Ind. 501, 504; Cooper v.
tam, 49 Id. 393,400; Langford v. Grierson, 5 Bradf. 361, 365;
Russell v. Long, 52 Iowa 250, 252; Miller v. Peieck, 18 W. Va.
75, 79-97. In a sense, therefore, as will be shown below, she can
trade with her separate property.
(d). Summary of Sources.-So that a married woman may be
found on her own account earning. money, trading or in business-
the meaning of these words will be defined below-by virtue (1) of
her right to her earnings, depending on her husband's consent or
on statute; or (2) of her ownership of equitable or statutory sepa-
rate property; or (3) of her capacities as a feme sole, due to the
peculiar conduct of her husband or to statute; or (4) of her capacity
to trade, due to custom or to statute.
Sect. 2. Definitions.-_Earnings, Trade, Business, etc.-Al-
though the distinction between personal earnings and the increase
of property is quite clear (see Mitchell v. Sawyer, 21 Iowa 582,
.583; also, supra), and for this reason, as hereinafter shown, mar-
ried women's separate property acts do not destroy a husband's
rights to his wife's personal services: Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich.
470, 480; it is very hard to draw any line between personal
earnings and the profits of trade in which property is used. See
Haight v. Mc Veagh, 69 Ill. 624, 629; Dayton v. Walsh, 46
Wis. 113, 120. The terms used in the books in connection with
married women's trade are not sharply defined, and their meaning
has given rise to considerable discussion.
(a). Earnings.-" Earnings" are what is earned, gained or
merited by labor, services or performances, wages or reward: Day-
ton v. Walsh, 47 Wis. 113, 120; and the earnings secured to a
married woman by a statute are not confined to the results of
manual labor-to wages for washing or sewing-but include the
products of trade also: Haight v. Mc Veagh, 69 Ill. 624, 628;
and the stock in trade of a married woman, bought with her earn-
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ings, is included within the term earnings: Lovell v. Newton, L.
R., 4 C. P. Div. 7, 11, 12.
(b). Trade and Business.-" Trade" or "business" means an em-
ployment to which the party devotes a considerable portion of her
time, skill and means (Rolmes v. Holmes, 40 Conn. 117, 119)-a
business thai is continuing in its nature and embraces many trans-
actions: Holmes v. .Holmes, 40 Conn. 117, 119; Proper v. Cobb, 104
Mass. 589,590). Engaging in trade and business means not only trad-
ing in a commercial sense, but also being engaged in other employ-
ments which require time, labor and skill: Netterville v. Barber,
52 Miss. 168, 171; it means engaging in a business pursuit,
mechanical, manufacturing or commercial: Nash v. Mitchell, 71
N. Y. 200, 203. To illustrate: Though a single transaction may
be a business one, it does not make the party a trader: Rtolmes, 40
Conn. 117, 119; Netterville v. Barber, 52 Miss. 168, 171; horse-
dealing may be a business, but a woman who buys or sells a single
horse is not necessarily in that business: Holmes v. Holmes, 40 Conn.
117, 120 ; Proper v. Cobb, 104 Mass. 589, 590 ; so, farming may
be a business, but employing a man to work on one's farm does
not make one a farmer by trade: Holmes v. Holmes, 40 Conn. 117,
120 ; renting a house may be a business transaction, and for the
purposes of trade: Knowles v. Hull, 99 Mass. 562, 564; but a
lease of rooms is not necessarily the contract of a trader : tolmes,
40 Conn. 117, 119; so a married woman's receipt and disburse-
ment of her rents and profits, though done in a business way, does
not constitute her a trader: Proper v. Cobb, 104 Mass. 589, 590;
Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N. Y. 200, 203; nor is she a trader when
she is not acting generally with the public, but is simply taking
care of her own property: Proper v. Cobb, 104 Mass. 589, 590;
or collecting or investing her income : Wheeler v. Raymond, 130
Mass. 247, 248, 249; Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N. Y. 200, 203.
When she may trade she is not confined to any particular trade:
Guttman v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455, 459; she may not only engage
in washing or sewing (Haight v. 1cfFeagh, 69 Ill. 624, 628),
dressmaking- or millinery (.Jassoy v. -Delius, 65 Id. 469, 471;
Tuttle v. Hoag, 46 Mo. 38, 40), keeping a dairy (Krouskop v.
Shontz, 51 Wis. 204, 205, 207), keeping a boarding-house (Chap-
man v. Briggs, 11 Allen 546, 547; Dawes v. Rodier, ]25 Mass.
421, 423; Rarnden v. Gould, 126 Id. 411, 412), keeping a grocery
or provision store (Haight v. Me Veagh, 69 Ill. 624, 628; Abbey
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v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374, 382), and in other pursuits specially
adapted to her sex (G-uttman, v. Seannell, 7 Cal. 455, 459); but
she may be a farmer (Camden v. Mullen, 29 Cal. 564, 566 ; Snow
v. Sheldon, 126 Mass. 332, 333; Chapman v. Foster, 6 Allen 136,
138; Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374, 382; Krouskop v. Shontz,
51 Wis. 204, 205, 207; but see AtcDaniel v. Cornwell, 1 Hill
S. C. 428, 429), a miller (Cooper v. Ham, 49 Ind. 393, 416), a
saloon or tavern-keeper (Porter v. Gamba, 43 Cal. 105, 108;
Nispel v. Laparle, 74 l11. 306, 307; Silveus v. Porter, 74 Penn.
St. 448, 449), a clothier (Guttman, v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455, 456 ;
Bellows v. Rosenthal, 31 Ind. 116, 117), an ironmonger (Abbey v.
De o, 44 Barb. 374, 382); she may work a mine or quarry, or
may go into the lumber business : NYetterville v. Barber, 52 Miss.
168, 172; though, if her trade is unsuited to her, this is a fact
to be considered, if her husband's creditors are trying to show that
the business is really his: Guttman v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455, 459.
So, she may engage in the professions-may devote her talents to
literature, acting, singing (Dayton v. Walsh, 46 Wis. 113, 120) ;
and, in fact, under a general power to trade, may follow any legiti-
mate calling: Guttman v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455, 459 ; Haight v.
lre Veagh, 69 Ill. 624, 628; Chapman v. Briggs, 11 Allen 546,
547.
(c). Separate Trade.-The trade of a married woman is usually
spoken of as her "separate" trade; but the word "separate"
refers rather to her independent status than to the mode in which
she shall trade (Zimmerman v. Erhard, 58 How. Pr. 11, 14); and
it does not mean that she shall trade alone, or prevent her living
with her husband while trading (Lovell v. NVewton, L. R., 4 C.
P. D. 7, 12; Newbrick v. Dugan, 61 Ala. 251, 253; Parker
v. Simonds, 1 Allen 258, 260), or allowing him to join in the
business: Cuttman v. Seannell, 7 Cal. 455, 459. In some
states, however, it has been held that she must keep her business
separate (Hfaas v. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 389, 396), or separate
from her husband (Lord v. Parker, 3 Allen 127, 129), and that
the joint and mingled earnings of husband and wife are his pro-
perty: Hawkins v. Providence, 119 Mass. 596, 599.
Sect. 3. Capacity to Trade at Common Law.-At common law
when a husband was civilly dead, had abjured the realm, etc., his
wife had the status of an unmarried woman (see Stewart 'Mar. &
Div., sects. 175-178), and, therefore, could trade as such (Carey
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v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 575, 43 Am. Rep. 790); and in
some states there are statutes to this effect declaratory of the com-
mon law. See Hannon v. .Madden, 10 Bush 664, 667 ; Woodcock
v. Reed, 5 Allen 207, 208. So, by the custom of London and other
places a married woman carrying on trade apart from her husband
had the capacities of a feme sole (Petty v. Anderson, 2 C. & P.
38, 39; Beard v. Webb, 2 Bos. & P. 93, 97; Lovie v. Phillips,
3 Burr. 1776, 1783; Netterville v. Barber, 52 Miss. 168, 171;
Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 575; 43 Am. Rep. 790); but
such a custom has never existed in. this country (see Jacobs v.
Featherstone, 6 W. & S. 346), except in South Carolina: (Mc-
Daniel v. Cornwell, 1 Hill S. C. 428, 429; Newbiggin v. Pellans,
2 Bay 162, 165; Dial v. Neuffer, 3 Rich. 78, 79.)
Sect. 4. Capacity to Trade in .Equity.-In those states where a
married woman is afeme sole in equity as to her equitable separate
estate, she may use the same in trade, and the profits of such trade
are equitable separate property likewise: Johnson v. Gallagher, 3
DeGex, F. & J. 494, 509; Jarman v. Wooloton, 3 Term 618,
622; Conklin v. Doul, 67 Ill. 355, 357; Jenkins v. Flinn, 37
Ind. 349, 352; Stevens v. Reed, 112 Mass. 515; Penn v. White-
head, 17 Gratt. 503, 512, 513; Partridge v. Stocker, 36 Vt. 108,
115 ; (Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 579 ; Todd v. Lee, 16
Wis. 480, 483; but in such trade she has no personal capacities:
Conklin v. Doul, 67 Ill. 355, 357 ; Tuttle v. Hfoag, 46 Mo. 38, 41 ;
cases last cited. Equity recognises her separate existence only
with respect to her separate property, and her contracts made in
the course of her trade can be collected only if they have been
properly charged on said property. See Todd v. Lee, 16 Wis.
480, 483. In those states where she has, as to her equitable
separate property, only the powers expressly given her, she can,
of course, exercise only such powers.
Sect. 5. Capacity to Trade with consent of -Husband.-A hus-
band cannot, by his consent,- change the personal status of his wife
(Stewart Mar. & Div., sect. 181), or enable her to trade with the
capacities, rights and liabilities of afeme sole (Uhrig v. Rorstman,
8 Bush 172, 177) ; but he may allow her, as his agent, to engage
in business and to retain the profits (Ashworth v. Outram, L. R.,
5 Ch. Div. 923, 931); or he may agree, before or after mar-
riage, that she shall keep her earnings or carry on business for
her own use (Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503, 512); and he
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may give her, if he chooses, the necessary capital to start with:
Lockwood v. Collin, 4 Robt. 129, 136. Any such gift of earn-
ings, profits or property, is good, at least in equity, against him-
self; (see Jarman v. Irooloton, 3 Term 618, 622; Ashuorth v.
Outram, L. R., 5 Ch. Div. 923, 931 ; Oglesby v. Hall, 30 Ga. 386,
390 ; Jenkins v. Flinn, 37 Ind. 349, 352 ; Conklin v. Doul, 67 Ill.
355, 357; Fisk v. Cushman, 6 Cush. 20, 29; Cropsey v. .4e-
Kinney, 30 Barb. 47, 57; .ammis v. MeLaughlin, 35 N. Y.
647, 650; Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503, 512; -Richardson
v. Merrill, 32 Vt. 27, 36 ; Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571,
579; Stimson v. Phite, 20 Wis. 562, 563); and his heirs,
voluntary assigns, etc., (Riehardson v. Xerrill, 32 Vt. 27, 36);
but not against his creditors (Uhrig v. Horstman, 8 Bush
172, 176; Cropsey v. McKinney, 30 Barb. 47, 57; McKinnon
v. McDonald, 4 Jones Eq. 1, 6), unless on valuable consideration:
Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503, 512. When a wife thus trades
under a settlement from or agreement with her husband, she
takes in equity as -with equitable separate property (Penn v.
Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503, 513); at law the business, profits,
etc., are absolutely the husband's: Stimson v. White, 20 Wis.
562, 563. If the husband's consent to his wife's trading is by
mere oral assent and without consideration, though he cannot ask
back profits already made and collected by her (see Green v. Pal-
las, 12 N. J. Eq. 267, 268; Partridge v. Stocker, 36 Vt. 108,
114), he can revoke his consent and claim the business as his own:
Conklin v. Doul, 67 Ill. 355, 357; Stimson v. White, 20 Wis.
562, 563. If she carries on her business independently of her
husband with equitable separate property, though by his consent,
provided that he takes no part therein and gives the world no right
to trust his credit: (see Ifortman v. Price, 47 Ill. 22, 24 ; Shackle-
ford v. Collier, 6 Bush 149, 159; Alt v. Lafayette, 9 Mo. App. 91 ;
Pawley v. Vogel, 42 Mo. 291; Lyman v. Place, 26 N. J. Eq. 30;
.National Bank v. Sprague, 20 Id. 13, 25; Quidort v. Pergeaux,
18 Id. 472, 480; Bucher v. Ream, 68 Penn. St. 421, 426); or
provided that all the credit is given to her (Jenkins v. Flinn, 37
Ind. 349, 352; Tuttle v. Hoag, 46 Mo. 38, 42, see Harvey v.
_Norton, 4 Jur. 42, 43; Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227, 241,
242; Taylor v. Shelton, 30 Conn. 122, 127, 128; M11orris v. Root,
65 Ga. 686, 688; 0onnerat v: Goldsmith, 6 Id. 14; Mleiners v
Munsen, 53 Ind. 138, 142; -Weisker v. Lowenthal, 31 Md. 4131
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418; Powers v. Russell, 26 Mich. 179; Hill v. Goodrich, 46
N. H. 41 ; Wilson v. Herbert, 41 N. J. L. 454, 461 ; Happek v.
Iartby, 7 Baxt. 411, 414; -Roberts v. Kelley, 57 Vt. 97, 101),
he is not liable; nor is she (Tuttle v. .7oqg, 46 Mo. 38, 41;
Conklin v. Doul, 67 Ill. 305, 308), though her equitable sepa-
rate estate may be, if properly charged. But if she is merely
doing business in 'her husband's place and stead with his con-
sent, she is merely his agent and the business is his; he may
claim the profits (Sivitzer v. Valentine, 4 Duer 96, 99; Stimson
v. White, 20 Wis. 562, 563), the business is liable to his creditors
(see Patton v. Gates, 67 Ill. 164, 167 ; Wilson v. Loomis, 55 Id.
352, 355; Clinton v. Rummell, 25 N. J.'Eq. 45, 47), and he is
liable for the debts of the business: Barlow v. Bishop, 1 East 432,
434; Godfrey v. Brooks, 5 Harr. (Del.) 396, 397; Conklin v.
Doul, 67 Ill. 355, 357; Jenkins v. Flinn, 37 Ind. 349, 352;
Cropsey v. HfcKinney, 30 Barb. 47, 57; Barton v. Beer, 35 Id.
78, 79 ; Switzer v. Valentine, 4 Duer 96, 99 ; Swasey v. Antram,
24 Ohio St. 87, 95; Jacobs v. Peatherstone, 6 W. & S. 347, 349;
Partridge v. Stocker, 36 Vt. 108, 114. Whether the business is
really his or hers is a question of fact: Jarman v. Wooloton, 3
Term 618, 622; Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 471, 479; Abbey v.
Deyo, 44 N. Y. 343; Partridge v. Stocker, 36 Vt. 108, 113.
What has been said under this section applies only where no stat-
ute has changed the common law as to married women's disabilities.
Under the statutes, generally, the husband's consent is not neces-
sary to enable a wife to trade, nor does his mere consent involve
him in the liabilities of the business.
Sect. 6. Capacity under Separate Property Acts.-As a general
rule, statutes which secure to married women the separate enjoy-
ment of their property, do not change their personal status (see
Md. Law Record, March 1, 1884)-a rule analogous to the rule
in equity, that equity recognises married women's separate exist-
ence only in connection with their separate property. These
acts do not -by implication destroy the husband's common-law
right to hi's wife's earnings (Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 580,
584; McLemore v. Pinkston, 31 Ala. 267, 270; Bear v. Hays,
36 Ill. 280, 281; Connor v. Berry, 46 Id. 370, 372; McMurtry
v. Webster, 48 Id. '123, 124; Marshall v. Duke, 51 Ind. 62;
Duncan v. Boselle, 15 Iowa 501, 503; Merrill v. Smith, 37 Me.
894, 396; Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 470, 482; Apple v. Ganong,
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47 Miss. 197, 199 ; Hoyt v. W7ite, 46 N. H. 45, 47 ; Quidort v.
Pergeaux, 18 N. J. Eq. 472, 480; Bider v. Hfulse, 33 Barb. 264,
270; Syme v. Riddle, 88 N. C. 463, 465; Baybold v. 1?aybold,
20 Penn. St. 308, 311); but they do usually expressly or by
implication secure to the wife the natural increase of her pro-
perty (Stout v. Perry, 70 Ind. 501, 504; and since such increase
is hers, though largely the result of her husband's efforts (Aldridge
v. ll'firhead, 101 U. S. 397, 399, there seems to be no reason
why her own services to it, though these belonged to her husband,
should injuriously affect her rights. See Mitcheltl v. Sawyer, 21
Iowa 582, 583. When a married woman has, as above suggested,
no powers by statute unconnected with her statutory separate pro-
perty, her dealings with such property in the way of trade must be
subject to limitations of the same character as those which control her
trading with her equitable separate estate : see O'.Daily v. ilforris,
31 Ind. 111, 112; Todd v. Lee, 16 Wis. 480, 483. She cannot, for
example, trade under such a statute on her personal credit: Glover
v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 470,480, 485; _obinson v. Wallace, 39 Penn. St.
133. Her power to manage her separate estate and her power to
trade are quite distinct: Wheeler v. Raymond, 130 Mass. 247, 248 ;
-Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N. Y. 199, 203. A contract for furniture to
be used in a boarding-house which is her separate property (Tillman
v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447, 454; Chapman v. Briggs, 11 Allen
547), or for horses for her livery stable (3fanderback v. llock, 29
Penn. St. 43, 47), may be invalid as contracts of a trader, but valid
as contracts with relation to her separate property.
Sect. 7. Capaeity under other Statutes.-A statute securing to a
married woman her earnings or the products of her skill and industry,
by implication enables her to earn money and to trade (see Haight
v. .Me "eagh, 69 Ill. 624, 628; Adams v. ltonness, 62 Barb. 326,
336; Krouskop v. Shontz, 51 Wis. 204, 215; Dayton v. Walsh, 47
Id. 113, 120; Bovard v. KYettering, 5 Out. 181), just as statutes
aecuring to married women property acquired by purchase en able them
to purchase on credit (Tiemeyer v. Turnquist, 85 N. Y. 516, 521;
39 Am. Rep. 674) ; thus alone are such statutes given a reasonable
meaning. A statute enabling married women to trade, unless it
contains restricting provisions (see Bradstreet v. Baer, 41 Md. 19,
23), enables them to trade just as if they were sole (Bodine v. .il-
leen, 53 N. Y. 93, 96)-to use any of the usual means of trade
(Guttman v. Seannell, 7 Cal. 458, 459), and to engage in any
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legitimate calling: flaight v. Mc Vea5 h, 69 Ill. 624, 628. In
some states the statutes require married women traders to secure
a special license, or file among the records a special declaration, or
obtain, a decree of court, before they can engage in trade (see
Adams v. Knowlton, 22 Cal. 283; Beading v. Mullen, 31 Id.
104, 106; Martinez v. Ward, 19 Fla. 176; _ranklin, 79 Ky.
497, 498; Horan v. Moran, 12 Bush 303; Uhrig v. Horstman, 8
Id. 172, 177; Wheeler v. Raymond, 130 Mass. 247, 248; Snow
v. Sheldon, 126 Id. 332, 334; Youngworth v. Jewell, 15 Nev. 45,
47; Iing v. Thompson, 87 Penn. St. 365, 368; -lsey v. MeDan-
iel, 95 Id. 472, 474; Orrell v. Van Gorder, 96 Id. 180, 181); but
it seems that she cannot plead her failure to conform with such
requirements, as they are simply for the benefit of the husband's
creditors: Porter v. Gamba, 43 Cal. 105, 109. See Youngworth
v. Jewell, 15 Nev. 45, 47. Since her personal incapacity to con-
tract is the main cause of a married woman's inability to trade at
common law, all statutes enabling her to contract indirectly enable
her to trade.
II.-THE INCIDENTS OF MARRIED WOMEN'S CAPACITY TO TRADE.
Sect. 8. Status, Rights and Liabilities of Married Women
Traders, Generally.-The status, rights and liabilities of married
women traders, have been already to some extent discussed, and
the importance, in this connection, of considering the source of a
particular trader's capacity in any particular case must be appar-
ent. Generally speaking, when a married woman can trade only
by virtue of her ownership of equitable or statutory separate estate,
she cannot trade on her personal credit or act as a feme sole
(O'Daily v. Morris, 31 Ind. 111, 112; Glover v. Alcott, 11
Mich. 470, 485; Bobinson v. Wallace, 39 Penn. St. 133; but
can only deal with the property so that the profits will enure to
her own benefit (Mitchell v. Sawyer, 21 Iowa 582, 583; Carey
v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 579; and can only render it liable for
her debts by charging it-contracting with reference to it, etc.-her
contracts bqing valid against it, not because she is a trader, but
because they are such as may be enforced in equity or under the
property acts. See Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447 ; Chap-
man v. Briqgs, 11 Allen 547; Manderbach v. Mock, 29 Penn. St.
43, 47; Todd v. Lee, 16 Wis. 480, 483. So, when she trades
simply as her husband's agent, though she binds him she does not
bind herself personally: (see Conklin v. Doul, 67 Ill. 355, 357;
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Tuttle v. .oag, 46 Mo. 38, 41; she may have the profits if he
chooses to let her keep them (see Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt.
503, 512; but he and the business are liable for the debts con-
tracted by her on its behalf: Partridge v. Stocker, 36 Vt. 108,
114. When, however, she may trade personally, by virtue of her
husband's abandonment, etc., by custom or by statute, she can trade
just as if unmarried: (Abbey v. -Deyo, 44 Barb. 374, 381;
unless, of course, the statute limits her capacity: Young v. Gori,
13 Abb. Pr. 13, 14. In such case, as will now be shown, she, for
the purposes connected with her business, has the status of a feme
sole, the fullest rights to the enjoyment of the profits of the busi-
ness, and the fullest liabilities for its debts.
Sect. 9. -Express Powers of Married Women Traders.-Most
of the statutes as to married women traders expressly provide that
they shall trade "as if sole," and under such statutes no special
questions seem to have arisen. See Berry v. Zeiss, 32 U. 0., 0. P.
231, 239; Porter v. Gamba, 43 Cal. 105, 109; Ilfartinez v.
Ward, 19 Fla. 175, 187, 188; Kingman v. Prank, 38 Hun
471; Williams v. Lord, 75 Va. 390, 398, 399; Krouskop v.
Shontz, 51 Wis. 204, 217 ; the main questions are as to the implied
powers of married women traders, and are discussed below. In
one case the naming of certain powers was held a denial of all other
powers: Bradstreet v. Baer, 41 Md. 19, 23 ; Cruzen v. McKaig,
57 Id. 404, 462.
Sect. 10. Implied Powers of Married Women Traders.-
Under statutes enabling a married woman to trade and not limiting
her capacities, she may trade precisely as if unmarried; she is, as
to her business, a feme sole, and may do all things incidental to
trading in general, and all things usual and proper in the particular
trade in which she is engaged: Young v. Gori, 13 Abb. Pr. 13, 14
note. See Berry v. Zeiss, 32 U. C., C. P. 231, 239; Trieber v.
Stover, 30 Ark. 727, 730; Camden v. Mullen, 29 Cal. 564, 566;
Porter v. Gamba, 43 Id. 105, 109; Rockwell v. Clark, 44 Conn.
534, 536; M1artinez v. Ward, 19 Fla. 175, 187; Nispel v. la-
parle, 74 Ill. 306, 308; Wallace v. Rowley, 91 Ind. 586, 589;
Tallman v. Jones, 13 Kans. 438, 445; Mitchell v. Sawyer, 21
Iowa 582, 583; Snow v. Sheldon, 126 Mass. 332, 334; Knowles
v. Hull, 99 Id. 562, 564; Rankin v. West, 25 Mich. 195, 201 ;
Allen v. Johnson, 48 Miss. 413, 418; Netterville v. Barber, 52
Id. 168, 172; Youngworth v. Jewell, 15 Nev. 45, 47 ; Wheaton
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v. Phillips, 12 N. J. Eq. 221, 223; Barton v. Beer, 35 Barb.
78, 80; James v. Taylor, 43 Id. 530, 531; Abbey v. Deyo, 44
Id. 397, 301; Adams v. ionness, 62 Id. 326, 336; Wood v.
Sanchey, 3 Daly 197, 198; Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N. Y. 200, 203;
.Freeking v. Rolland. 53 Id. 422, 425; Bodine v. Killeen, Id. 93,
96; Baum v. Mullen, 47 Id. 577, 579; Sammis v. MeLaugh-
lin, 35 Id. 647, 650; Kingman v. Frank, 33 Hun 471; Mor-
gan v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517 ; Silveus v. Porter, 74 Penn.
St. 448, 451; Wilthaus v. Ludecus, 5 Rich. 326, 329; Nfewbiggin
v. Pillans, 2 Bay 162, 165; William's v. Lord, 75 Va. 390, 398;
Krouskop v. Shontz, 51 Wis. 214, 217; Dayton v. Walsh, 47 Id.
113, 120. The object of these statutes is not only to do justice to
wives ( Youngworth v. Jewell, 15 Nev. 45, 47), but also to encourage
trade. See McDaniel v. Cornwall, 1 Hill (S. C.) 428, 429.
To illustrate: She may engage in any legitimate calling: Gutt-
man v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455, 459. She may conduct her business
personally or by agent; she may have her manager (Cooper v. Ham,
49 Ind. 393, 416), her salesmen and clerks (Guttman v. Scan-
nell, 7 Cal. 455, 459; Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374, 381); she
may be a partner, silent or active (Parshall v. Fisher, 43 Mich.
529, 534), as will be shown; and she may, unless this is pro-
hibited by statute (see Porter v. Gamba, 43 Cal. 105, 109), have
her husband as her agent (Guttman v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455, 459;
Bellows v. Rosenthal, 31 Ind. 116; -Rankin v. West, 25 Mich.
195, 200; Lockwood v. Cullin, 4 Robt. 129, 136; though, as will
be shown, whether she may be a partner with him is disputed.
She need not unless the statute so provides (_Ex parte Franklin,
79 Ky. 497, 498), have separate property to begin with .(Tallman
v. Jones, 13 Kans. 438, 445 ; Dayton v. Walsh, 47 Wis. 113, 120);
she may start out on credit (Young v. Gori, 13 Abb. Pr. 13, 14,
note), or use property given her by her husband (Lockwood v.
Cullin, 4 Robt. 129, 136), though, in the latter case, his creditors
may have rights. See Penn v. Whitehead, 12 Gratt. 74. The
capital and stock in trade (Lovell v. Newton, L. R., 4 C. P.
Div. 7, 12; James v. Taylor, 43 Barb. 530, 531,;) of her business,
as well as the profits (Mitchell v. Sawyer, 21 Iowa 582, 583;
Sammis v. McLaughlin, 35 N. Y. 647, 650; Silveus v. Porter,
74 1?enn. St. 448, 457; Meyers v. Bahte, 46 Wis. 655, 659;
Dayton v. Walsh, 47 Id. 113, 110) are hers; and such property,
though in the joint possession of herself and her husband, is in her
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possession-the possession following the title: .Yewbrick v. Dugan,
61 Ala. 251, 253 ; 23 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 627. She may, on
credit, purchase goods for her trade (Xispel v. Laparle, 74 Ill.
306, 308; Frecking v. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422, 425), or buy land
or seed for farming purposes (Camden v. Iullen, 29 Cal. 564,
566; Chapman v. foster, 6 Allen 136, 138); or rent a store
(Knowles v. Hull, 99 Mass. 562, 564); or contract for her services
(Adams v. Honness, 62 Barb. 326, 336); or contract for working
a quarry-for the laborers and mules (Netterville v. Barber, 52
Miss. 168, 172) ; she may, as if sole, transfer a note received by
her in the course of trade (Rockwell v. Clark, 44 Conn. 534, 536);
and she may even sell out her business, and agree not to use the
same name again: Morgan v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517. She
is personally liable on all contracts made by her in the course of
her business (Barton v. Beer, 35 Barb. 78, 80. See Trieber v.
Stover, 30 Ark. 727, 730; Nispel v. Laparle, 74 Ill. 306, 308),
even as endorser of a note (Wilthaus v. Ludecus, 5 Rich. 326,
327) ; she is liable for the frauds, etc., of her employees (Baum v.
ufullen,'47 N. Y. 577, 579), and is estopped, as if sole, from
denying their right to represent her (Bodine v. -Killeen. 53 N. Y.
93, 96); so, she is liable, as if sole, for goods consigned to her
(Newbeggin v. Pillans, 2 Bay 162, 165); she may make a deed
for the benefit of creditors (Schumann v. Peddicord, 50 Md. 560),
and take the benefit of the insolvent or bankrupt laws. See Ex
parte Holland, L. R., 9 Oh. Div. 307, 311; In re Kinkead,
3 Biss. 405, 410. But see, Relief v. Schmidt, 55 Md. 97.
Whether she is in business is a question of fact (see Jarman v.
Wooloton, 3 Term 618, 622; Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 471,
479; Abbey v. -Deyo, 44 N. Y. 343; Partridge v. Stocker, 36
Vt. 108, 113), though, if preliminaries are required, as the filing
of a declaration, whether the requirements have been fulfilled is,
of course, in part a question of law. So, whether a particular
transaction was in the course of her business is a question of fact:
Camden v. Mullen, 29 Cal. 564, 567. When she sues she must
allege and prove that she was engaged in business, and that the
right of action arose in the course thereof (Smith v. New .England,
45 Conn. 415, 420), and when she is sued these facts must be
alleged and proved by the plaintiff: Baum v. Mullen, 47 N. Y.
577, 579; Wood v. Sanchey, 3 Daly 197, 198; Nash v. Mitchell,
71 N. Y. 200, 203.
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Sect. 11. M1arried Women Traders as Partners.-It has been said
that a married woman trading in equity with her equitable separate
property, may enter into partnership (Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt.
503, 512); but this statement must be taken with limitations.
For the normal contract of partnership is a personal contract
involving a personal capacity (Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571,
576; 43 Am. Rep. 790), which a married woman does not have in
equity or under mere separate property acts. Accordingly, it is
settled that statutes securing to married women their property with
the rents, profits, increase, etc., do not enable them to enter into
partnership: Bradstreet v. Baer, 41 Md. 19, 23; Mayer v. Soys-
ter, 30 Id. 403; -oward v. Stephens, 52 Miss. 239, 244; Brad-
ford v. Johnson, 44 Tex. 381, 383; Carey v. Burnuss, 20 W. Va.
571, 576; 43 Am. Rep. 790. At common law, when a female part-
ner married the partnership was dissolved (Bassett v. Shepardson,
52 Mich. 3; Alexander v. Morgan, 31 Ohio St. 546, 550); and now
she cannot be a partner if she has no capacity to trade personally
(see Swasey v. Antram, 24 Ohio St. 87, 95; -Carey v. Burruss,
20 W. Va. 574, 575; 43 Am. Rep. 790), or if she is expressly
prohibited by the statute enabling her to trade (see Todd v. Clapp,
118 Mass. 495, 496), or so far as she is thereby partially prohibited
(see Porter v. Gamba, 43 Cal. 105, 109), as she is in some states.
But as she has, under statutes giving her the capacity to trade gen-
erally, the personal capacity to trade as if sole and the power to
pursue all the usual methods of trade, by the weight of authority,
she may under such acts, trade in partnership (.Kinkead, 3 Biss.
405, 410; Camden v. Mullen, 29 Cal. 564, 565; Francis v.
Dickel, 68 Ga. 255, 258; Preusser v. Henshaw, 49 Iowa 41, 44 ;
Westphal v. Ifenney, 49 Id. 542, 543; Plumer v. Lord, 5 Allen
460, 462; Parshall v. Fisher, 43 Mich. 529, 532, 534; ewman
v. Morris, 52 Miss. 402, 406; Zimmerman v. Erhard, 58 How.
Pr. 11, 13; 8 Daly 311; Bitter v. Bathman, 61 N. Y. 512, 513;
Scott v. Conway, 58 Id. 619 ; Graff v. Kennedy, 81 Alb. L. J. 2;
Silveus v. Porter, 74 Penn. St. 448, 449; ifrouskop v. Shontz, 51
Wis. 204, 217 ; Horneffer v. Duress, 13 Id. 603, 605)-she may
even be a secret partner: see Parshall v. Fisher, 43 Mich. 529, 534;
Scott v. Conway, 58 N. Y. 619; Bitter v. Rathman, 61 Id. 512,
513. Still in a few cases and on different grounds this capacity to
be a partner has been denied: Haas v. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 389,
396; Montgomery v. Sprankle, 31 Id. 113, 115; Maghee v. Baker,
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15 Id. 254, 257; Bradtreet v. Baer, 41 Md. 19, 23; Cruzen v.
McKaig, 57 Id. 454, 462; Garey v. Burruss, 20 IV. Va. 571, 576 ;
43 Am. Rep. 790. So also as she is afeme sole in her trade, and
may, therein employ general or special agents, and may employ her
husband as such there seems to be no reason why she should not be
able, when she can be partner at all, to be the partner of her hus-
band, and accordingly many cases hold (In re Kinkead, 3 Biss.
405, 410 ; Francis v. Dickel, 68 Ga. 255, 258; _Newman v. M11orris,
52 Miss. 402, 406 ; Zimmerman v. Erhard, 58 How. Pr. 11, 13.;
Graff v. Kennedy, 31 Alb. L. J. 2), while others assume (see
Camden v. Mullen, 29 Cal. 554, 565; Westphal v. Hnney, 69
Iowa 542, 543; Parshall v. Fisher, 43 Mich. 529, 532, 534;
Silveus v. Porter, 74 Penn. St. 448, 449; Krouskop v. Shontz, 51
Wis. 204, 217; Horneffer v. Duress, 13 Id. 603, 604), that she
can. But this has been strenuously denied, on the ground that
even where a married woman may contract, she cannot, at law,
without express authority, contract with her husband, and that the
particular statute enables her to trade on her "separate ' account:
Lord v." Parker, 3 Allen 127, 129 ; Edwards v. Stevens, Id. 315 ;
Plumer v. Lord, 5 Id. 460, 462 ; Allen v. Johnson, 48 Miss. 413,
419. See Haas v. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 389. To this it may be
replied that if a wife may employ her husband as her agent, as all
admit she can, it is not consistent to say that she cannot contract
with him at all, and that the word "separate," in the statutes, refers
to the wife's status; not to the manner in which she shall trade:
Zimmerman v. .Frhard, 58 How. Pr. 11, 13, 14.
In such cases as she cannot be a partner, and therefore could not
be held liable as partner on a note not signed by her (Carey v
Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 582; 43 Am. Rep. 790; Plumer v. Lord,
7 Allen 481, 485), she may, nevertheless, be liable for her indi-
vidual acts: Uruzen v. MeKaig, 57 Md. 454, 462; and she does
not in such cases lose her property put into the firm business:
.M1aghee v. Baker, 15 Ind. 254, 257. So, even when she cannot
join a firm of which her husband is a member (Plainer v. Lord, 7
Allen 481,484), she may, after his retirement, go in, and on a fiew
consideration become liable for pre-existing partnership debts : see
Preusser v. Henshaw, 49 Iowa 41, 44. So, though she cannot be
a partner, she may jointly lease and share the profits of joint pro-
perty (Allen v. Johnson, 48 Miss. 413, 419), and be bound by her
husband's acts as her agent with respect thereto: -Beiman v. 1am-
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ilton, 111 Mass. 245, 247. In a few cases, without speaking of
husband and wife as partners, equity has decreed an apportionment
of the profits of a business carried on by them jointly: see Glidden
v. Taylor, 16 Ohio St. 509, 522; Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt.
503, 513.
Sect. 12. M1arried Women as Corporators, Stockholders, &c.-Very
nearly the same questions arise in considering a married woman's
capacity to be an incorporator as those which are involved i'n her
right to be a partner: Plummer v. Lord, 5 Allen 460, 462. Cor-
porators enter into a mutual and personal contract, which is con-
cluded by the act of incorporation (Taylor, Corporations, sect. 31);
and therefore without personal capacity to contract a married woman
could not be an incorporator. But, as business is very commonly
carried on by corporations, a married woman with a general capa-
city to trade would, it seems, have by implication the capacity to
be an incorporator. The fact that the corporation laws provide that
"any person" may be an incorporator, would not give such capacity
to a married woman under disabilities, for such general laws apply
only to persons sui juris: see rule discussed, Md. Law Record,
March 1st 1884. But a married woman may be a stockholder,
holding her stock as any other chose in action; and it has been
held that when her choses in action are her separate property she is
liable as any other stockholder for assessments, &c. : Anderson v.
Line, 14 Fed. Rep. 405, 406; The Beciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y.
9, 15.
It is of course difficult to, state with certainty the law on so com-
plicated a subject as that discussed in this article, and many of the
points touched upon would bear much elaboration; but we have
endeavored simply to collect the cases relating to the trade of
married women and to give in a few words the law as it appears
therein.
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